The fate of nations and millions of people in it are sometimes determined by War. Life and death, freedom and slavery depend on victory and defeat. So it is not surprising that war has been a subject elaborate studies. The result of these studies occupies volumes. Military academies, Think tanks and Policy analysts benefit from these studies. The affair of war should also interest to people who are involved in conflict with other entities –both internal and external, both physical and otherwise.
Ivan Arreguin – Toft puts forward his theory on war in his new book ‘How the weak win wars’ ( Yes-, the weak do win ). His work brings out his theory on asymmetric warfare and its relation to the fortunes of conflict.
Victory of the weak
Isn’t it the strong who win wars? Not so – Ivan Toft points out. The side which uses its strength most appropriately ultimately wins.
Strength of nations or non state actors is defined by – availability of resources, wealth, sophistication of arms and size of its fighting force. Considering this, America and Russia are world powers. China is another military powerhouse. Compared to these nations, Vietnam and Afghanistan fall far behind. Yet, this century saw wars in which Vietnam ‘defeated’ America and fought China to a standstill. The Soviet Red army could not wipe out the Mujahidin in Afghanistan.
These are not isolated incidents of ‘weak winners’. In conflicts big and small all over the world between 1900 and 1949, the nations which we considered conventionally strong could ‘win’ only 65.1 percent of the time. From 1950 to 1999, the strong won just 48.8 percent of conflicts.
The reason for these victories by the weak has been analyzed by many scholars. Different theories have been put forth to explain this apparent contradiction. There is some truth in every such theory. Yet, till now no single theory has been able to consistently explain these events. What Ivan Toft has done is to critically analyze each of these theories and come up with one which can be fit into each of these situations.
Three theories, by other authors, on why the weak win wars
Before we get into Ivan’s theories, it would be appropriate to look into the theories of other analysts on why the weaker side wins. To start with the ‘Interest asysmetry theory’ brought out by Andrew J.R Mack explains that there is less interest of a more powerful side to fight as its survival is not threatened and this contributes to the victory of the weaker side. The relatively larger power fights for economic or policy reasons while for the smaller one it is a question of Survival. The smaller one will be prepared to fight longer, while in the largen side, the public outcry to end the war will be louder as the war drags on.
The second theory cites ‘form of governance’ in the conflicting entities as an important parameter affecting the outcome of a conflict. Normally in a democratic entity, public opinion will prevent it from implementing brutal methords ( which may or cause civilian casuality in the opposing entity ). Public pressure will force a democratic government from prosecuting a long drawn out war. In an autocratic system of government there will be no public pressure to prevent the side from implementing brutal tactics or prosecuting a long drawn out war strategy. Thus autocratic systems of government have an advantage over democratic governments in fighting wars and they may win even though they are a weaker power.
The third condition, as cited by other analysts, in which the weak may win wars is when the weaker side manages to aquire high teck weapons relative to the stronger side.
Ivan’s theory of Asymmetric warfare
Though the above three theories successfully explains the outcome of many of the conflicts, according to Ivan Toft, they do not explain all the events. Ivan says that when the conflicts are evaluated in detail, the underlying reasons of victory and defeat is seen to be the asymmetry ( or symmetry ) in the tactics used by the opposing sides.
What Ivan means can be simply put this way : When opposing sides uses the same tactics, the conflict is symmetric and the stronger side wins. When opposing sides used different tactics, the conflict is asymmetric and the weaker side has the chance of winning.
For example if the stronger side used Armored Personnel Carriers and Tanks and the weaker side takes the fight to a terrain unsuitable for armor and using mines and machine guns adopts the Guerilla Warfare Strategy ( GWS ), the weak side the winning chance.
Ivan has arrived at his theory by analyzing the wars from 1878 to 2005. He goes through different stages of each war and explains how the fortunes of the conflict varied with the opposing sides adopting different strategies making the conflict symmetric or otherwise.
For example he has divided the conflict between Strong Russian troops and the Chechen Islamic rebels between 1830 and 1859 into three phases.
In the first phase the Russian forces used a brutal strategy ( Barbarism )of annihilation against not only the Chechen rebels but also the local population of Chechnya. The Chechen rebels fought back using Guerilla Warfare Strategy ( GWS ). With both sides using unconventional techniques the conflict was symmetric and the stronger Russian side gained.
In the second phase of the war, the Russians adopted a strategy of conventional warfare and proclaimed the capture of Chechen leader Samil as one of its aims. Samil continued his Guerilla campaign, thus bringing asymmetry in the conflict. This time, the weaker side, the rebels, won.
Meanwhile there was a change in the Russian leadership and the new rulers implemented a policy of giving clemency to surrendering Chechen rebels even while continuing a brutal campaign there. This policy of giving amnesty is a classic counter insurgency strategy and it worked. The Russians also began destroying the forests lining the mountains of Chechnya thus denying cover to the rebels. Such unconventional methods made the conflict symmetrical once again and the stronger side the Russians won that round.
Present and the Future
Recent wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq have showed how a determined ragtag force capable of learning lessons and improvising can fend off total annihilation by a much advanced invader. Yet, the warriors on both sides are learning. Larger nations have learnt to tailor their forces to fight unconventionally and with minimum civilian causalities. The news channels function as embedded news giving a sanitized version of the conflict and thus cushioning the impact of public ire in democratic counties.
Achieving symmetry in India
For India the lessons of history have profound implications. The insurgencies in the forests of Chhattisgarh and the Kashmir valley need to be handled and the force applied should be carefully calibrated so as not to give the advantage of asymmetry to the insurgents and terrorists. Signal Technology and human intelligence should mated to fix insurgent concentrations to which rapidly moving platforms should be used to direct firepower and insert troop. Local amnesty to surrendering militants and severe punishment to recidivism should go hand in hand. There is no ready-made unified strategic formula to manage a conflict. As for any other problem, each situation presents a separate question paper and its up to us to answer it in the most appropriate fashion.
